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BACKGROUND AND OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY 
Over the past decade startup accelerators have become key players in startup ecosystems. The first 
modern type startup accelerator was founded in 2005. Due to the novelty of this phenomenon, there 
has been only very little academic literature on the long-term impacts of startup accelerator pro-
grams. This thesis studies companies that have completed startup accelerator programs at the time 
they get acquired. The study offers relevant insights for both entrepreneurs considering participat-
ing in accelerator programs and for corporations that consider partnering with accelerators or ac-
quiring one of their portfolio companies. 
 
DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
This study uses a novel data set collected from public online startup databases such as Crunchbase. 
The data set covers startups that were acquired by a public U.S. based company between August 
2006 - April 2016 and had participated at least in one startup accelerator program. For a startup 
accelerator to be included in the sample, it must be a for-profit organization and have had at least 
on exit where the portfolio company was acquired by a public company. The ’accelerated’ startups 
were matched with a similar company that was acquired to compare the differences in the ac-
quisitions. Furthermore, I categorize the startup accelerators in the sample in two groups based on 
their size and performance to study the impact of the quality of the accelerator programs. 
 
FINDINGS OF THE STUDY 
I find that abnormal stock returns around the announcement date are higher when the acquisition 
target is a startup accelerator backed company rather than a company backed only by regular ventu-
re capital investors. Further comparative analysis shows that ’accelerated’ companies get acquired 
signicantly younger than their peers. The results also suggest that these differences hold when most 
prominent accelerators with most success are excluded from the sample. However the companies 
accelerated by the most prominent accelerators seem to have much more success in terms of attrac-
ting investors and raising funding. 
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TUTKIELMAN TAUSTA JA TAVOITTEET 
Viimeisen vuosikymmenen aikana startup-kiihdyttämöt ovat vakiinnuttaneet asemansa startup-
ekosysteemeissä. Ensimmäinen moderni startup-kiihdyttämö, Y Combinator, perustettiin vuonna 
2005. Y Combinatorin menestyksen myötä maailmalla on perustettu jopa satoja samaan malliin 
perustuvia kiihdyttämöitä. Ilmiön uutuuden vuoksi akateeminen tutkimus startup-kiihdyttämöistä 
on keskittynyt lähinnä niiden lyhyen aikavälin vaikutuksiin. Tämä tutkielma keskittyy startup-
kiihdyttämöiden pitkän aikavälin vaikutuksiin. Erityisenä merkkipaaluna kiihdyttämöohjelmiin 
osallistuneiden yritysten pitkän aikavälin kehityksessä voidaan pitää yritysostoa, jossa vakiintunut 
yritys ostaa kiihdyttämöohjelmaan osallistuneen yrityksen. Tutkielman tavoitteena on tarjota 
näkemystä sekä yrittäjille, jotka harkitsevat osallistumista kiihdyttämöohjelmaan, kuin myös yri-
tyksille, jotka harkisevat startup-kiihdyttämöiden kanssa yhteistyötä tai niiden portfolioyrityksen 
ostoa. 
 
LÄHDEAINEISTO JA TUTKIELMASSA KÄYTETTY METODOLOGIA 
Tutkielmassa käytetään dataa, joka on kerätty julkisista startup-yrityksiin keskittyvistä tietokan-
noista. Yksi näistä tietokannoista on muun muassa Crunchbase. Kerätty data käsittää Yhdysvalta-
laisiin kiihdyttämöohjelmiin osallistuneet yritykset, jotka Yhdysvalloissa julkisesti listattu yritys on 
ostanut elokuun 2006 ja huhtikuun 2016 välisenä aikana. Startup-kiihdyttämöiden rajauksen ulko-
puolelle jätettiin voittoa tavoittelemattomat kiihdyttämöt ja kiihdyttömät, joiden portfolioyrityksistä 
yhtäkään ei ole ostanut Yhdysvalloissa julkisesti listattu yritys. Lisäksi tutkielmassa verrataan kiih-
dyttömöohjelmiin osallistuneita yrityksiä muihin riskipääomasijoittajien portfolioyrityksiin. Tut-
kielmassa verrataan myös eri startup-kiihdyttämöiden kokojen ja tunnettavuuden vaikutusta niiden 
pitkän aikavälin tuloksiin. 
 
TUTKIELMAN KESKEISET LÖYDÖKSET 
Yritysostot, joissa kohde on startup-kiihdyttömön portfolioyritys, vaikuttavat normaalista poikkea-
vaa positiivisemmin ostavan yrityksen osakekurssiin verrattuna yritysostoihin, joissa kohde ei ole 
osallistunut kiihdyttömöohjelmaan. Lisäksi vertailu paljastaa, että kiihdyttömöohjelmiin osallistu-
neet yritykset ostetaan merkittävästi nuorempina kuin verrokkiyritykset. Vähemmän tunnettuihin 
kiihdyttömöihin mediassa kohdistuneesta kritisisoinnista huolimatta edellä mainitut tulokset pitävät 
vaikka vertailun ulkopuolelle rajataan tunnetuimpien kiihdyttömöiden portfolioyritykset. Kiihdyt-
tämöiden välinen vertailu kuitenkin paljastaa, että tunnetuimpien kiihdyttömöiden portfolioyrityk-
set houkuttelevat muita enemmän sijoittajia ja keräävät enemmän rahoitusta. 
 
 
 
Avainsanat  Startup, startup-kiihdyttämö, pääomasijoittaminen, yritysostot 
Table of Contents 
 
1 INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................................. 7 
2 ABOUT THE ESSENENCE OF STARTUP ACCELERATORS .................................. 10 
2.1 Defining a startup accelerator ......................................................................................... 10 
2.2 The role of startup accelerators in the venture capital ecosystem .................................. 11 
2.3 The effectiveness of startup accelerators ........................................................................ 14 
2.4 Ties between startup accelerators and corporations ....................................................... 14 
3 LITERATURE REVIEW ................................................................................................... 16 
3.1 Motives for acquiring venture-backed firms .................................................................. 16 
3.2 When do acquirers earn abnormal returns? .................................................................... 17 
3.3 The role of venture capitalists in acquisitions ................................................................ 18 
3.4 The role of startup accelerators in exits .......................................................................... 20 
4 HYPOTHESES .................................................................................................................... 22 
5 DATA AND METHODOLOGY ........................................................................................ 24 
5.1 Acquisitions of startup accelerator backed firms ........................................................... 24 
5.2 Event study methodology ............................................................................................... 27 
5.3 Other variables ................................................................................................................ 28 
5.4 Matching technique ........................................................................................................ 29 
5.5 Statistical tests ................................................................................................................ 29 
6 RESULTS & ANALYSIS ................................................................................................... 31 
6.1 Univariate comparison of startup accelerator backed firms and venture capital investor 
backed firms at the time of their acquisitions ....................................................................... 31 
6.2 Do better accelerators 'accelerate' more? ........................................................................ 33 
6.3 Are all accelerator programs worth it? ........................................................................... 36 
6.4 Abnormal returns to acquirers of startup accelerator backed firms ................................ 38 
6.5 Does accelerator quality matter for acquiring companies? ............................................ 40 
7 LIMITATIONS ................................................................................................................... 42 
8 CONCLUSIONS .................................................................................................................. 43 
8.1 Summary of findings ...................................................................................................... 43 
	 5	
8.2 Suggestions for further research ..................................................................................... 44 
APPENDICES ........................................................................................................................ 46 
BIBLIOGRAPHY .................................................................................................................. 51 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
	 6	
List of tables 
 
Table 1. Summary of differences between startup accelerators, incubators and angel  
investors ................................................................................................................................... 10 
Table 2. Startup accelerators included in the sample, their investment terms and backers ..... 25 
Table 3. Startup accelerators’ exits .......................................................................................... 26 
Table 4. Comparison of startup accelerator and only venture capital backed firms ............... 22 
Table 5. Startup accelerator rankings and categorization ........................................................ 35 
Table 6. Comparison of premium and standard accelerators .................................................. 36 
Table 7. Comparison of standard accelerator graduate companies and regular venture capital 
backed companies at the time of acquisition ............................................................................ 37 
Table 8. Cumulative abnormal returns to acquiring companies .............................................. 39 
 
List of figures 
 
Figure 1. Median venture capital deal sizes in the US in 2016 ............................................... 12 
Figure 2. VC-backed exits values ............................................................................................ 18 
Figure 3. Number of acquisitions of startup accelerator backed firms by public companies . 27 
 
 
 
 
 
	 7	
1 INTRODUCTION 
 
Along with the boom in startups in recent years, new types of ecosystem players have emer-
ged. One type of these new ecosystem players are startup accelerators. Paul Graham founded 
Y Combinator in 2005, which is considered by many to be the first the modern type startup 
accelerator. Today, there are hundreds of startup accelerators around the world with estimates 
varying between 300 and over 2000 (Cohen and Hochberg, 2014). Alone in the United States, 
there were 172 startup accelerators, up from only 16 accelerators in 2008. These accelerators 
have invested in more than five thousand U.S. based startups with a median investment of one 
hundred thousand dollars during the 2005 to 2015 period. These companies raised over 19.5 
billion dollars in funding during this time period (Hathaway, 2016). Many of the world’s cur-
rently most valuable startups such as AirBnB, DropBox and Stripe have participated accelera-
tor programs. Earlier studies show that startup accelerators can have a significant positive 
impact on the performance of the startups that participate in their programs, even when com-
pared with other early-stage investors.  
Startup accelerators have received a lot of attention, but they have also been studied very little 
in academic literature. Given the relative newness of the phenomenon, there are no publicly 
available large datasets related to it. Thus there is only a handful of papers studying startup 
accelerators. Most of this academic literature focuses on the short-term impacts of startup 
accelerators. However an imporant long-term milestone for many nascent companies is get-
ting acquired by a larger company. An acquisition is the most common way for an entrepre-
neur and early-stage investors to get a meaningful exit while initial public offerings are relati-
vely rare, especially when it comes to startup accelerators’ portfolio companies. Thus the time 
of an acquisition is a suitable point in time to study the long-term impacts of startup accelera-
tors. Using a hand-picked sample, this paper studies how startup accelerator backed firms and 
firms backed only by ’regular’ venture capital investors differ along various dimensions at the 
time of their acquisition. I also study whether there are differences between different accelera-
tors’ long-term impacts. Critics of startup accelerators claim that only the most premier acce-
lerators have a positive impact on startups that participate in their programs. Some weaker 
accelerators have been even claimed to be harmful for entrepreneurs taking part in their prog-
rams. After all, equity is the most valuable currency entrepreneurs have and accelerators take 
a significant equity stake in their portfolio companies in return for a relatively small cash in-
vestment. In this paper I show that participating in a premier accelerator program is almost 
	 8	
always a better choice for an entrepreneur. However as the top programs are highly selective, 
many entrepreneurs are left with a choice of participating in a weaker accelerator program or 
not participating in an accelerator program at all. Many entrepreneurs have been very success-
ful and have had meaningful exits even without participating in an accelerator program. The-
refore, I analyze whether it makes sense for an entrepreneur to participate in a weaker accele-
rator program by comparing companies that went through these programs with companies that 
only had ’regular’ venture capital funding at the time of their acquisition. 
Studying acquisitions also opens an interesting new avenue of research. Almost all previous 
literature discusses the impacts of startup accelerators solely from an entrepreneur’s perspe-
citve. To my knowledge, no one has ever studied the acquisitions of startup accelerators’ port-
folio companies from the acquirer’s perspective. As startup accelerators’ portfolio companies 
are often at the forefront of developing new disruptive technologies or services, their ac-
quisitions could signal valuable information about the acquiring company’s future plans to the 
stock markets. There are few papers, which study how the involvement of venture capital af-
fects acquirer returns. However given that there are significant differences between normal 
venture capital investors and startup accelerators, a comparison of acquisitions involving the 
two different types of investors is in place. 
Even though it is out of the scope of this paper, I also give an overview of the relationships 
between established companies and startup accelerators to depict a larger picture. Especially 
for large technology companies, partnering with a startup accelerator may have two motives; 
investing in startup accelerators can generate a return on the company’s cash while also gai-
ning insight into new startups and technologies that may be of strategic interest to the compa-
ny. In some cases large companies might even partner with a startup accelerator to create a 
corporate accelerator program. Corporate accelerators operate rather similarly to regular acce-
lerator programs but they derive their objectives from the sponsoring organization (Heine-
mann, 2015). This phenomenon is related to corporate venture capital, which is another topic 
that has gained much attention recently but it is out of the scope of this paper. 
The purpose of this paper is to increase the overall understanding about startup accelerators. I 
aim to provide relevant insights both to entrepreneurs considering participating in one of the 
startup accelerator programs as well as to large companies that are considering partnering 
with a startup accelerator. My study adds to the existing literature by analyzing the effecti-
veness and long-term impacts of accelerator programs with empirical evidence. Furthermore, 
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this paper confirms some of the findings in previous literature with a new sample. The re-
mainder of this paper is structured as follows. In section 2, I provide a definition of a startup 
accelerator, give an overview of existing literature on them and discuss their ties with other 
types of investors as well as corporations. In section 3, I review other related literature such as 
literature about motives for acquiring venture-backed firms, circumstances where acquirers 
can earn abnormal returns and the roles played by venture capitalists and startup accelerator 
firms in acquisitions of their portfolio companies. Section 4 goes over the hypotheses. Section 
5 gives an overview of the data used in my study and then explains the methdology. Section 6 
contains the empirical results and discusses the findings as well as how they relate to previous 
literature. Section 7 looks at the limitations of this paper. Section 8 concludes and gives sug-
gestions for further research. 
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2 ABOUT THE ESSENENCE OF STARTUP ACCELERATORS 
 
2.1 Defining a startup accelerator 
Startup accelerators are often confused with other early types of organizations supporting star-
tups such as incubators and angel investors. Table 1 summarizes the key differences between 
the aforementioned types of organizations. 
 
Table 1.  
Summary of differences between startup accelerators, incubators and angel investors 
 Accelerators Incubators Angel investors 
Duration 3-6 months 1-5 years Ongoing 
Cohorts Yes No No 
Business model Investment / non-profit Rent / non-profit Investment 
Selection frequency Competitive, cyclical Non competitive Competitive, ongoing 
Venture stage Early Early or late Early 
Education offered Seminars Ad hoc, hr / legal None 
Venture location Usually on-site On-site Off-site 
Mentorship Intense Minimal, tactical As needed, by investor 
Source: Cohen, Hochberg. 2014. “Accelerating startups: The seed accelerator phenomenon”. 
SSRN Journal, March 2014, 1-16. 
 
Miller and Bound (2011) have listed five main features that comprise a startup accelerator 
program model. First, accelerators have an application process that is publicly open, but are 
highly competitive. In fact the acceptance rates of the most prominent accelerators in recent 
years have varied between less than 1% and 6%. Second, accelerators provide early-stage 
investment, typically in exchange for equity. Third, accelerators tend to focus on small teams 
instead of individual entrepreneurs. Fourth, accelerators provide time-limited support inclu-
ding programmed events and mentoring. Last, accelerators typically have cohorts or groups of 
startups instead of investing in individual companies ongoingly. It is this combination of fea-
tures that sets accelerators apart from other approaches to investment or business incubation. 
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To summarize, for the purposes of this paper I define a startup accelerator program as  fol-
lows: 
A startup accelerator is an organization that organizes fixed-lenght programs that provide 
mentorship, networking, office space and education components to nascent firms . The prog-
rams vary typically between 3-6 months in length, take in groups of startups for each program 
and culminate in a demo day or a pitch event. 
Furthermore, this paper focuses only on for-profit accelerators that provide capital in exchan-
ge for equity. In fact, only 60% of North American accelerators are for-profit ventures and 66% 
take equity in their portfolio companies (Global accelerator report 2016, Gust). Thus there are 
some accelerator programs that take equity but are at the same time not for-profit organiza-
tions. This distinction is therefore necessary as the motives for these different types of accele-
rator programs are different. 
 
2.2 The role of startup accelerators in the venture capital ecosystem 
Startup accelerators don’t provide major funding to their portfolio companies but they take a 
relatively significant share of equity in exchange for participating in their programs. The ave-
rage investment by U.S. accelerators in 2016 was only slightly more than 36,000$ (Global 
accelerator report 2016, Gust). Even though the accelerators might make follow-on invest-
ments after an accelerator program has ended, this is still a signicantly smaller figure when 
compared to typical venture capital investment rounds. Figure 1 shows the median venture 
capital deal sizes in the United States in 2016. 
As the value of a startup accelerator’s investments in portfolio companies typically goes up 
only when startups raise more funding, the main motive for accelerators is that process. Star-
tups which have recently completed an accelerator program have relative small valuations, on 
average around 7 million dollars (Hathaway, 2016). This makes them somewhat too small to 
become acquisition targets in most cases and certainly too small to be able to bear the costs of 
an IPO process. Instead, having participated in a prominent accelerator program signals to 
potential investors high quality (Kim and Wagman, 2014). 
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Figure 1.  
Median venture capital deal sizes in the US in 2016 
The figure shows the median venture capital deal size by financing round. The financing 
rounds are also called series in venture capital terms. Seed round is typically the first round of 
major funding for a startup but some might have raised smaller amounts before seed round. 
Multiple investors might participate in any given financing round. 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
                  Source: Venture Pulse Q4/2017, KPMG 
Accelerator programs are known by investors to use unique and comprehensive selection cri-
teria and thus have higher success rates for their graduates. (Hoffmann and Radojevich-Kelley, 
2012). The typical selection process used by the most startup accelerators usually starts with 
an application phase for a specific program. Most prominent startup accelerators can receive 
thousands of applications for each program. The accelerators then go through the applications 
and do their due diligence. Most promising startups are invited to a round of interviews after 
which the startups for the program are selected1. The criteria for selecting the startups typical-
ly involve evaluating the applying startup’s team composition, product, business model, trac-
tion for the business, earlier funding and long-term vision. These criteria are not often public 
but for example 500 Startups, a highly popular and one of the most prominent startup accele-
rators, published the following six characteristics (called BLASTR) they look at in startups2: 
• Balanced, smart team that can learn quickly and be persistent. 
• Launched product. 
																																								 																				
1	The	application	process	varies	between	startup	accelerators.	More	information	can	be	found	on	each	accelerator’s		website	such	as	for	
2	500	Startups’	BLASTR	evaluation	characteristics	adapted	from	”10	tips	for	getting	into	our	next	accelerator	batch”	–article	available	on	
500	startups’	website:	https://500.co/ten-tips-for-getting-in/	
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• Aspirations to use 500 Startups’ growth resources to help grow and/or raise a big 
seed round. 
• Strong understanding of the customer and unit economics behind the business. 
• Traction. Early but recognizable traction. 
• Raised some money previously. 
Depending on the accelerator, some accelerators might also give preference to startups that 
have contacts with people who are associated with the accelerator, such as the accelerator’s 
employees, mentors or alumni.  
Startups accelerators have rather close ties with angel investors and venture capital investors 
as they want them to invest in their portfolio companies. Often this includes inviting them to 
demo days where the startups present their businesses. Some startup accelerators also or-
ganize separate investor days, which are events designed to facilitate meetings between the 
portfolio companies and potential investors. Furthemore, some startup accelerators also have 
a more direct connection to angel investors and venture capital investors as they may invest in 
the startup accelerator’s fund. The motive behind supporting the startup accelerators is that 
they create a pipeline of companies that other investors can invest in (Miller and Bound, 
2011). Thus the accelerators’ value created for investors is having the mechanisms to scout 
and filter for talent in place. 
 
2.3 The effectiveness of startup accelerators 
The majority of existing literature on startup accelerators focuses on their effectiveness, most-
ly from a startup’s perspective. As noted in previous sections, accelerators have close ties 
with other types of investors. This is one of the startup accelerators’ main value propositions 
to startups considering participating in one of their programs. Many studies find that acceleta-
tors increase the success rates of startups by providing entrepreneurs with access to angel and 
venture capitalist which tend to, on their part, increase overall success rates (Hoffman and 
Radojevich-Kelley, 2016 & Hathaway, 2016). Regmi, Ahmed and Quinn (2015) provide a 
data driven analysis in their paper on how much startup accelerators impact the success rates. 
They find that accelerator graduates have circa 23% higher survival rates than other startups 
in the United States. They define survival as a startup still operating or having exited (ac-
quisition or IPO) after certain time period from founding the company. What is perhaps even 
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more critical to startup survival, is not the fact that they are able to attract venture capital in-
vestment, but how soon they can raise the capital. As capital is often needed to reach other 
key milestones faster, such as gaining customer traction, participating in an acceletor program 
can clearly be more beneficial than getting the initial investment from other types of investors 
(Winston-Smith and Hannigan, 2015). 
Hallen, Bingham and Cohen (2016) study what is driving the effectiveness of startup accele-
rators and the positive effects associated with them. Even though they find some evidence for 
admitting only a small percentage of applicants and the argument that higher quality entrepre-
neurs are more likely to apply to accelerator programs, they argue that consultation provided 
by accelerators is the main driver for better venture outcomes. They find that startups receive 
intensive consultation during accelerator programs in form of meeting with mentors, accelera-
tor directors, sharing learnings with other entrepreneurs in the program and almost daily se-
minars by relevant subject matter experts. Startups are also encouraged to interact actively 
with customers during the accelerator programs. This learning mechanism coupled with con-
necting with potential investors seems to result in best outcomes. 
Some papers find that the positive effects to startup founders can only be attributed to the lea-
ding accelerators. Some papers even go further to make the argument that outside of the most 
prominent accelerators, the impact of participating in an accelerator program may be ambi-
guous or even negative (Hathaway, 2016 & Hallen, Bingham and Cohen, 2014). As cohort 
sizes have significantly increased over time, accelerators may have a harder time signaling the 
quality of startups to potential investors (Kim and Wagman, 2014). Especially, entrepreneurs 
with venture-backed founding experience may gain less benefit from participating in an acce-
lerator program. However, for novice entrepreneurs accelerators can provide those valuable 
connections with venture capitalists that might take them a longer time to make on their own 
(Zhang, 2007). 
 
2.4 Ties between startup accelerators and corporations 
Since the launch of first startup accelerator programs, the relationships between accelerators 
and corporations have grown in stregth. From startup accelerators’ perspective the reason to 
co-operate with corporations is mostly to ensure financial sustainability of the accelerator as 
relying solely on exits from investments in their portfolio companies can take a long time to 
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realize. Global Accelerator Report (Gust, 2016) surveyed 579 accelerators around the world 
and found that more than half of them were at least partially funded by a corporation. 67% of 
the surveyed accelerators also aimed to generate more revenue from services sold to corpora-
tions. These services mainly include while-label or jointly-run acceleration programs run by 
the accelerator on behalf of the corporation and corporation sponsorship packages. In addition 
to short-term financial motives, corporations can also increase the prospects of accelerators’ 
portfolio companies, which translates into more exits for the accelerator in the long-term. 
These mechanisms include potentially selling services, raising funding or getting acquired by 
these corporations. 
From a corporations’ perspective, startup accelerators are an efficient and effective way to 
engage with startups. By partnering with accelerators, corporations can access the accelerators’ 
marketing power and networks which enable launching a program much quicker than corpo-
rations would be able to do on their own. Corporations can also boost their own brand by 
aligning with accelerators and their portfolio companies which are seen as symbols of innova-
tion in the eyes of the public. However perhaps the most important benefit for corporations is 
accessing the accelerators’ deal flows. This gives corporations insight into the latest innova-
tions in their market. Corporations can also build a more innovative culture within their or-
ganization by placing executives as mentors in accelerators (Global accelerator report 2016, 
Gust). 
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3 LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
In this section, I review the relevant literature and present relevant studies in order to provide 
further background information about the topics of my thesis. I start by exploring the motives 
for acquiring venture-backed firms. All companies in my sample have raised venture capital 
funding and almost without exception they can be considered as high-technology firms. The-
refore I focus more spesifically on literature on sourcing technological knowledge and inno-
vation through acquisitions. Second, I look under which circumstances acquirers can earn 
abnormal returns. Third, I take a closer look why so many new ventures eventually get ac-
quired over other exit methods. In order to construct a complete picture, I also study startup 
accelerators’ motives when it comes to exiting their investments. 
 
3.1 Motives for acquiring venture-backed firms 
The average company lifespan on the S&P 500 index has decreased dramatically from 61 
years in 1958 to only 18 years in 2012 (Innosight 2012). There are naturally multiple reasons 
but the most impactful driver of this shift has been the accelerating pace of technological in-
novation. As we have witnessed over the past few years, new technology-enabled entrants 
have the ability grow quickly and pose serious threats to industry incumbents. When faced 
with risks of becoming obsolote driven by new technologies, large companies can either per-
form their own research and development or acquire new entrants who are successfully inno-
vating, as noted by Banker, Wattal and Plehn-Dujowich (2011). Complementing internal re-
search and development efforts with aggressive acquisition programs has been a growing 
trend now for years especially in high-technology industries (Ransbotham and Mitra, 2010). 
Compared to internal research and development efforts, acquisitions provide large companies 
with a quick access to key technologies, talent and capabilities. Even the companies, which 
are considered to be the most innovative in the world have actually acquired some of their 
most iconic innovations. For example, Google bought Android and Apple bought Siri. Indeed, 
acquisitions of small private firms is a viable research and development strategy to explore a 
range of potential future innovation opportunities (Ismail, 2008). 
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3.2 When do acquirers earn abnormal returns? 
It has been well documented in the academic literature that acquirers of private targets per-
form better than acquirers of public targets around the announcement date. While there are 
significant positive returns associated with acquiring private targets, announcements of ac-
quiring public targets are often found to destroy value. This has been documented in all ad-
vanced markets such as U.S. (Capron and Shen, 2007 & Fuller, Netter and Stegemoller, 2002) 
and western Europe (Faccio, McConnell and Stolin, 2006). Fuller, Netter and Stegemoller 
(2002) argue that buyers in somewhat illiquid market for assets, in this case private firms, do 
not pay as high price for a firm as compared to public targets. They conclude that there is a 
discount for illiquidity and buyers capture it. Furthermore, Capron and Shen (2007) find that 
less information available on private target firms creates more opportunities for exploiting 
private information. 
The relative size of the acquisition target compared to the acquiring company has been found 
to predict performance. Sirower (1997) finds that acquisitions where the target is less than 10 
percent the size of the acquirer have a higher chance of success because there is a more detai-
led understading of the businesses and quicker integration potential. King, Slotegraaf and 
Kesner’s (2008) finding that when the acquisition target is less than half of the size of the ac-
quirer, the acquisition is associated with higher performance, supports this argument. It is also 
worth mentioning here that the size of the acquirer itself can be reflected in shareholder re-
turns. Moeller, Schlingemann and Stulz (2004) found in their study that the announcement 
return to the acquiring firm is approximately two percentage points higher for small acquirers, 
regardless of the form of financing and even whether the acquisition target firm is private or 
public. A related factor to relative size of the acquisition target is its age. Ransbotham and 
Mitra (2010) argue that there are two kinds of benefits from acquiring younger targets. First is 
that there are various growth options that provide greater opportunities for a synergistic fit. 
Second is that there is a greater uncertainty in the valuation of the target company that leads 
to a lower price. 
Finally, acquirers can impact their performance with target selection and by helping increase 
the acquired firm’s probability of success in the market competition. Capron and Pistre (2002) 
find that acquirers do not earn abnormal returns when they only receive resources from the 
target. In this case it is more probable that various bidders could have captured these resour-
ces and thus have competed away any abnormal returns. Instead acquirers should expect to 
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earn abnormal returns if they transfer their own resources to the target firm such as product 
innovation capabilities and subject matter expertise.  
 
3.3 The role of venture capitalists in acquisitions 
In 2016, for every dollar of IPO proceeds, 143 dollars were spent on mergers and acquisitions 
(CNBC, 2017). Both IPOs and acquisitions allow investors in private companies to cash out. 
It is worth noting that while some mergers are between two public companies, the volume of 
acquisitions involving private targets is significantly higher than that of including publicly 
traded firms. When it comes to comparing exits only by venture-backed firms, the difference 
in the size of IPOs and acquisitions as exit types is smaller but still significant. 
 
Figure 2.  
VC-backed exits value 
The figure shows the total value of North America and Europe VC-backed exit activity both 
for acquisitions and IPOs. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                  Source: Pitchbook annual VC liquidity report 2016 
 
Bayar and Chemmanur (2006) find that many firms would be able to obtain higher valuations 
in the IPO market but nevertheless choose to be acquired. They list few factors that drive the 
choice between IPO and acquisitions. First they argue that firm insiders have private informa-
	 19	
tion about the success probablity in product market competition. However this information 
asymmetry varies between different exit mechanisms. Insiders’ information advantage over 
IPO market investors is more likely to be higher while information asymmetry relative to po-
tential acquirers tends to be smaller. In fact, common investors can actually help reduce in-
formation asymmentries associated with the transaction by forming a bridge between the ac-
quiring firm and the target firm. Acquisition announcement returns are also likely to be more 
positive for acquisitions in which the acquirer and target share a common venture capital in-
vestor (Gompers and Xuan, 2008). Second, Bayar and Chemmanur argue that while an entre-
preneur derives benefits of control as well as cash flow benefits from managing the firm, the 
venture capitalist will make the exit choice based on financial considerations alone. 
Ragozzino and Blevins (2016) study in their paper how venture capital involvement affects 
the likelihood of firms going public or being acquired. They find that the number of venture 
capital firms invested in a firm is correlated with a higher probability of an acquisition of the 
firm; on average about 3 percent for every additional venture capitalist that funds the firm. 
However their paper does not find evidence for their hypothesis that the total dollar amount 
invested in a company by venture capitalists would increase the likelihood of exit via ac-
quisition (in the case of IPOs the total amount invested heavily increases the odds of going 
public). Raising venture capital is usually very critical for an early stage firm to stay alive and 
continue their growth. Ragozzino and Blevins also find that there is a negative relationship 
between the time it takes a startup to raise its initial round of financing from venture capita-
lists and the probability of exit. For each year after founding that a startup does not get its first 
investment, the probability of an exit decreases by 13%. 
Acquirer returns are on average higher when acquiring venture capital investor backed firms. 
Masulis and Nahata (2011) find that the average acquirer returns on announcement are two 
percentage points higher for venture capital backed targets as compared to other private target 
firms. There are two main reasons for this documented in academia. Firstly, exits are not only 
optional for venture capital funds. Most venture capital funds have a fixed maturity, usually 
ten years with an option to extend for a couple more years. Therefore venture capital firms 
that wish to stay in business must first successfully raise funds, invest the funds in new bu-
sinesses, then exit the portfolio companies and return the money and profits to the fund inves-
tors, who in turn are expected to reinvest the proceeds with the same venture capital firm. 
Thus venture capital investors and startup founders may have incentives to seek different exit 
strategies. Venture capitalists tend to acquire increasing control over exit in the later stages of 
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investment in a company by securing additional board seats and by obtaining contractual exit 
rights. This results in a sophisticated transfer of control from the founders to venture capital 
investors when financial investments increase (Smith, 2005). The second explanation is that 
venture capitalists may have close (usually financial) ties to acquirers, which creates a conflict 
of interest between venture capitalist and other investors. The conflict of interest can out-
weigh negotiation skills and certification benefits that venture capitalists provide to their port-
folio companies during the acquisition negotiation process (Masulis and Nahata, 2011). 
 
3.4 The role of startup accelerators in exits 
Startup accelerators don’t provide major funding but they still usually own a significant share 
of their portfolio companies. That is, accelerators gain on their investments when their portfo-
lio companies attract subsequent investments (it is rare that a firms value decreases when it 
receives new round of venture capital, however it does happen). Accelerators gain valuable 
private information as they work very closely with their portfolio companies during accelera-
tor programs. Usually the relationship does not end after demo day. For example, one of the 
most prominent accelerators, Y Combinator, has a wide variety of resources available for its 
alumni network ranging from community activies (such as gatherings, formal events and on-
line platforms), advice (for example workshops, conferences, office hours with Y Combinator 
partners) and capital investments in subsequent funding rounds3.  
The most prominent accelerators are known to advice their portfolio companies around the 
acquisition process. Even though the accelerators don’t typically hold enough equity share in 
their portfolio companies to have control over the timing of exit, Kim and Wagman (2014) 
find that accelerators have incentives to exit their investments early in case they receive nega-
tive signals about a portfolio company. In other words, accelerators wish to exit early if a 
portfolio company seems to have less potential than initially thought. This of course does not 
make a portfolio company worthless but accelerators have less incentive to wait for full in-
formation disclosure (or in other words wait to see how things turn out for the company). 
Furthermore, accelerators rely on part on their track records to attract high quality startups to 
participate in their programs. While accelerators might want to hold on to the most promising 
																																								 																				
3	A	more	detailed	list	of	resources	available	to	Y	Combinator	founders	and	alumni	can	be	found	on	their	website:	
https://www.ycombinator.com/why/	
	 21	
portfolio firms in hopes of big exits, acquisitions of other portfolio companies are important 
in maintaining an attractive brand. 
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4 HYPOTHESES 
 
This section presents the hypothesis of this study which are based on previous literature and 
the research questions of my study. After each set of hypotheses, I explain the related theory 
and reasoning. 
H1: Startup accelerator backed firms give more control over exit to their investors than other 
venture-backed firms. 
As noted by Masulis and Nahata (2011), venture capital firms have to exit their investments 
after a certain time period in order to stay in business. The more control investors have over a 
firm, for example in terms of equity share or board seats, the more they can impact the timing 
of the exit and the acquisition price. As accelerators are able to attract more investors to invest 
in their portfolio companies than other types of early investors, the investors should have mo-
re control in accelerators’ portfolio companies. Furthermore, as accelerators have typically 
close relationships with their portfolio companies even after they have graduated their prog-
rams, they have a lot of information about the quality of the startups. According to Kim and 
Wagman (2014) acceletators may themselves have incentives to exit their investments early in 
some cases. As they take a significant equity share early for relatively little investment and 
may even have exclusive rights to invest more in later rounds, accelerators should therefore 
have significant impact over the timing of exit in their portfolio firms. 
H2: Companies that have graduated from premium accelerators are able to attract signifi-
cantly more funding and investors than graduates from less prominent accelerators. 
H3: Premium accelerators significantly shorten the time it takes to have a meaningful exit 
than the less prominent accelerators. 
Taking into consideration the critique that the less prominent accelerators’ impact on startup 
success is questionable, I aim to find evidence for this claim by proving that graduates from 
leading accelerators are able to raise more funding and attract more investors. To further find 
evidence for this, I expect to find that graduates from leading accelerators get acquired signi-
ficantly younger than graduates from less prominent accelerators. The logic behind these hy-
potheses is that the leading accelerators have better networks and their certification matters 
more to investors than certification from a weaker accelerator. 
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H4: Less prominent accelerators do not impact the long-term outcomes of their portfolio 
companies any more than regular early stage venture capital investors. 
Assuming evidence for the hypotheses two and three can be found, further analysis could 
show that less prominent accelerators are in fact harmul for some entrepreneurs. If the long-
term outcomes of less prominent startup accelerators’ graduate companies do not differ mea-
ningfully from the outcomes of companies with regular early stage venture capital backing, 
the argument can be made that the weaker programs are not helpful for all entrepreneurs. If an 
entrepreneur manages to raise funding without certification from a startup accelerator, the 
entrepreneur would be then giving up a significant share of equity for little or no gain. 
H5: Acquirers earn higher abnormal returns when the target is a startup accelerator gradu-
ate firm rather than when the target company is only backed by venture capital investors. 
Assuming hypothesis one can be proven, investors might use their increased control over exit 
to accept a lower selling price for their portfolio companies, if it is in their interests. Further-
more, since startup accelerator involvement can signal higher quality and their portfolio com-
panies are often assiociated with disruptive technologies, acquiring one of their portfolio 
companies might reveal information about the acquiring firm’s future strategic plans, which 
could be reflected in the stock price reaction. I also expect to find that acquisitions of startup 
accelerator graduate firms have greater valuation uncertainty if they get acquired younger. As 
found by Ransbotham and Mitra (2010), this should lead to lower prices. 
H6: Acquirers earn higher abnormal returns when the target firm is a premium startup acce-
lerator graduate as compared to when the target firm is a graduate from a less prominent 
startup accelerator. 
For similar reasoning as in hypotheses two and three, acquirers should be able to earn higher 
abnormal returns when the target firm is a graduate from a premium startup accelerator when 
other factors than startup accelerator quality are excluded from the comparison. 
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5 DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
 
5.1 Acquisitions of startup accelerator backed firms 
I began my data collection process by identifying startup accelerators that fit the description 
and criteria as described in chapter 2. Furthermore, to be included in the sample the accelera-
tor has to have at least one exit where a portfolio company has been acquired by an U.S. 
headquartered company which has its stock listed either on AMEX, NASDAQ or NYSE. 
Table 2 lists the startup accelerators included in the sample and gives further information on 
their investment terms as well as their backers. 
After identifying the startup accelerators, I compiled a sample of completed acquisitions that 
were announced between August 26, 2006 and April 7, 2016. The data was obtained primarily 
from Crunchbase which is a community-edited startup database. The data was supplemented 
with information from startup accelerators’ webpages. The announcement dates for the ac-
quisitions were confirmed by checking from various online publications covering private 
companies such as TechCrunch and Venturebeat. Also press releases of the acquiring and the 
acquired firms were used to check the data. To be included in the sample the following condi-
tions must be satisfied: 
1. The target is a privately held company that has participated in at least one accelerator 
program listed in table 2. 
2. The acquiring company is U.S. headquartered and its stock was listed on the AMEX, 
NASDAQ or NYSE at the time of acquisition announcement. 
3. The acquiring company has no publicly known equity share in the target firm. 
Table 3 shows how the acquisitions are distributed by startup accelerator. Figure 2 shows the 
number of acquisitions by year. 
As it can be seen from table 3, the majority of startup accelerators’ exits are acquisitions whi-
le IPOs are rare. Out of 432 exits by acquisition, 132 fulfill the conditions above. For twelve 
acquisition events, there was not enough data to confirm the announcement dates and thus 
they were removed from the sample. In addition, there were five cases where the target firm 
had participated in two different accelerator programs. One of these cases was already remo-
ved from the sample due to lack of data to confirm the announcement date. Removing the 
four remaining duplicates, the final sample of acquisitions includes 116 unique observations. 
	 25	
Table 2.  
Startup accelerators included in the sample, their investment terms and backers 
The investment terms are percentage shares of equity in the portfolio company unless noted 
otherwise. VCs in the backers column is an abbreviation for a venture capital fund. 
Accelerator Investment terms Backers 
Y Combinator 7% VCs and angel investors 
Techstars Up to 10% VCs and angel investors 
500 Startups 
5% + follow-on right up to 
500k or 20% of next round 
VCs and accredited investors 
DreamIT Ventures 
5-8% or 25% of next round 
with 20% discount 
VCs, angel investors,              
large corporations 
Seedcamp 7,5% VCs and angel investors 
Alchemist Accelerator 5% VCs and CVCs 
AngelPad 7% VCs and angel investors 
AlphaLab 5% & 25k convertible note Innovation Works (VC) 
The Brandery 6% & 25 convertible note VCs 
FounderFuel 5% VCs 
PIE 6% Large corporations 
fbFund 
Right of first refusal for the 
first round of financing 
VCs and Facebook 
Amplify.LA 
5% & option for 10% more 
in exchange for 200k 
VCs and angel investors 
Launchpad LA 
6% & option for 50k conver-
tible note 
Accredited investors 
Betaspring 
4-8% of revenue for 36 
months 
VCs 
Imagine K12 6% 
Founding team, Y Combinator 
(accelerator) and Acta Wireless 
(VC) 
Rock Health N/A 
Private equity firms,               
large corporations 
UpWest Labs 8% Accredited investors 
i/o Ventures 8% Accredited investors 
     Sources: Company websites and various technology news publications. 
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Table 3.  
Startup accelerators’ exits 
In the table Exits (total) represents the total number of successful exits including both ac-
quisitions and initial public offerings. Acquisitions column is exits where the portfolio com-
pany has been acquired. By public companies –column is the number of acquisitions where 
the portfolio company has been acquired by a publicly listed company listed in AMEX, 
NASDAQ or NYSE. Date not available –column is the number of acquisitions by public 
companies where the acquisition announcement date could not be confirmed or it was not 
available in Crunchbase. Observations column is the number of companies acquired by publi-
cly listed companies minus the number of observations where acquisition announcement date 
was not available. 
Accelerator Exits (total) 
Acquisi-
quisi-
tions 
By public     
companies 
Date not  
available 
Observa-
tions 
Y Combinator 133 132 50 4 46 
Techstars 74 74 17 0 17 
500 Startups 111 109 26 2 24 
DreamIT Ventures 13 13 1 0 1 
Seedcamp 18 18 3 0 1 
Alchemist Accelerator 10 10 5 0 5 
AngelPad 17 17 3 0 3 
AlphaLab 4 4 3 0 3 
The Brandery 4 4 1 0 1 
Founder Fuel 6 6 4 2 2 
PIE 2 2 2 0 2 
fbFund 4 4 3 1 2 
Amplify.LA 7 7 2 0 2 
Launchpad LA 4 4 4 1 3 
Betaspring 4 4 1 1 0 
Imagine K12 3 3 1 0 1 
Rock Health 11 11 2 0 2 
UpWest Labs 4 4 2 0 2 
i/o Ventures 6 6 2 1 1 
TOTAL 435 432 132 12 120 
- Duplicates (startup participated in                
two accelerators) 
5 1 4 
TOTAL without duplicates 127 11 116 
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Figure 3.  
Number of acquisitions of startup accelerator backed firms by public companies 
The figure shows the number of startup accelerator backed companies that got acquired each 
year by a publicly listed company in the U.S between August 26, 2006 and April 7, 2016. The 
acquisition year is determined by the acquisition announcement date. 11 companies were 
omitted because the exact acquisition announcement date could not be verified. 
 
 
5.2 Event study methodology 
The purpose of event study methodoly is to detect abnormal changes in stock prices occuring 
because of an identified ”event”. I take the acquisition announcement as my event to discover 
whether there are any patterns useful for trading. The typical event study methodology invol-
ves calculating cumulative abnormal returns. 
I calculate the abnormal return using the capital asset pricing model (CAPM): 𝐴𝑅!,! = 𝑅!,! − 𝛽! ∗ 𝑅!,! − 𝑅!,! + 𝑅!,!  
where, 
ARi,t  is the abnormal return of stock i at time t 
Ri,t is the actual return of company i’s stock at time t 
Rm,t is the return of S&P 500 index at time t 
Βi  is the 3-year beta of company i’s stock against S&P 500 
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Rf,t is the one-month U.S. treasury bill rate 
The cumulative abnormal return, CAR, is defined as: 
𝐶𝐴𝑅!,(!!,!!) = 𝐴𝑅!,!!!!!!!  
where, 
T1 and T2 are the beginning and ending days of the event window. 
I calculate the cumulative abnormal returns using 21-day time window. Time window is the 
time span around the event day during which the analysis is conducted. The event day, t = 0, 
is defined as the announcement day of acquisition. Thus 21-day time window is (-10, +10) 
days around the event day. This time window enables capturing the abnormal return better 
than shorter time windows because acquisitions of startups may in many cases be reported in 
news later than the actual acquisition announcement date. Furthermore, the acquisition an-
nouncements might themselves give investors more information about the acquiring compa-
ny’s future plans due to the high-tech nature of the acquired companies. Therefore there might 
be further news or speculation around the acquisition announcement date.  
 
5.3 Other variables 
Other variables in the analysis include: 
AGE 
The acquisition target’s age in years. The age is calculated as the year of acquisition announ-
cement minus the year the acquisition target was founded. 
FUNDING 
The total amount of equity funding in millions of U.S. dollars raised by the acquisition target 
before the acquisition announcement. 
 
 
	 29	
INVESTORS 
The total number of different investors who have invested in the acquisition target. The figure 
also includes the startup accelerator as an investor if the acquisition target has participated in 
an accelerator. 
 
5.4 Matching technique 
I compare the acquisitions of accelerator-backed firms to acquisitions of venture capita 
backed firms. In order to ensure that the results are not affected by variations across different 
industries or different acquirer characteristics, this study employs a matched firm technique. 
For each startup accelerator backed firm that was acquired by a publicly traded company, I 
identify a similar venture capital investor backed firm acquired by the same company. To be 
included in the matched sample, a venture capital backed firm must have been acquired no 
more than 2 years before and 2 year later than the startup accelerator backed firm. 
 
5.5 Statistical tests 
To test whether a variable is statistically indifferent from zero, t-test is conducted with the 
following formula, 
𝑡 =  𝑋𝑠𝑛  
where, 
X is the sample mean, 
s is the sample standard deviation, 
n is the number of observations. 
To test the difference between two sample means, the startup accelerator sample and the mat-
ched firms sample, across different variables, two-sample t-test is conducted with the follo-
wing formula, 
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𝑡 = 𝑋! − 𝑋!𝑠!!𝑁! + 𝑠!!𝑁! 
where, 
X1 and X2 are the sample means, 𝑠!! and 𝑠!! are the sample variances, 
N1 and N2 are the number number of observations (sample sizes). 
The t values are compared to the critical values at the significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1% 
of the two-tailed test. The result is considered significant if the value of t is larger than the 
critical value. Finally the t values are converted into p values which are used in this paper to 
report the results. 
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6 RESULTS & ANALYSIS 
 
6.1 Univariate comparison of startup accelerator backed firms and venture capital in-
vestor backed firms at the time of their acquisitions 
I compare startup accelerator backed firms and firms backed only by regular venture capital 
investors along three dimensions in table 4 at the time they were acquired. To control for fac-
tors, such as for example different acquirer characteristics, described in section 5.4, if a data 
point for a variable could not be obtained for both the startup accelerator backed firm and its 
matched firm, the comparison does not include that pair. Therefore the number of pairs may 
be different for each variable. 
Table 4.  
Comparison of startup accelerator and only venture capital backed firms  
The table compares startup accelerator and only venture capital backed firms along three di-
mensions at the time the firms were acquired. AGE rows report the average and median age 
of the firms in years. FUNDING rows report the average and median equity funding raised by 
the companies in millions of U.S. dollars. INVESTORS rows report the average and median 
number of different investors. Test of differences column reports the p-values from statistical 
difference tests between the two means or medians for each variable. The number of pairs 
column reports the number of acquired startup accelerator backed companies which could be 
matched with a venture capital backed firm where the data for both was available. 
 Accelerator backed firms 
VC backed 
firms 
Test of 
differences 
(p-values) 
Number 
of pairs 
Average AGE 3,1 5,4 0,0001 102 
Median AGE 3,0 4,0 0,0499 102 
     
Average FUNDING 4,8 19,3 0,0028 39 
Median FUNDING 2,5 7,3 0,3054 39 
     
Average INVESTORS 8,6 6,5 0,1479 38 
Median INVESTORS 6,5 5,0 0,2949 38 
 
I find that firms which have participated in startup accelerator programs get acquired signifi-
cantly younger, on average at 3.1 years old,  than their venture capital backed counterparts 
(5.4 years). This difference in the acquisition target companies’ ages also seems to be reflec-
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ted in the amount of funding the firm raises before it gets acquired. On average, venture capi-
tal backed firms raise four times the amount of capital that startup accelerator backed firms 
raise before they get acquired. The difference between the two mean amounts of capital raised 
is statistically significant at 5% confidence level. However due to small number of matched 
pairs, this could not be confirmed by comparing the medians. The difference in the amounts 
of funding is mostly due to the fact that venture capital backed firms have had more time to 
raise funding as they get acquired older. Furthermore, funding is typically raised in rounds 
which increase in size. In my sample 56,9% of the 58 venture capital investor only backed 
firms for which data was available have had a Series A financing round or a later financing 
round. The same figure for the 119 startup accelerator backed companies for which data was 
available is 33,6%. 
I also examine the number of different investors the firms have. Startup accelerator backed 
firms seem to have slightly more investors (on average 8.6) than their VC-backed peers (on 
average 6.5). The difference is not statistically significant but it is somewhat surprising taking 
into account that startup accelerator backed firms get acquired younger and raise less capital 
before getting acquired. This suggests that startups have better access to investors through 
accelerator programs and have better chances of raising capital as a result of the credibility 
gained by getting accepted to the accelerator program. 
These results act as a proxy for testing my first hypothesis as equity ownerships of acquired 
companies were not public for my sample of acquired companies. My first hypothesis was 
that startup accelerator backed companies give more control over exit to investors than regular 
venture capital investor backed firms. Based on my findings, this hypothesis could not be 
completely confirmed. As regular venture capital backed firms get acquired later and raise 
more funding, one could expect these firms to give up a higher share of equity ownership. 
However startup accelerator backed firms have more investors which one could also expect to 
result in a higher share of equity held by investors. Furthermore, as discussed in section 2.2, 
firms backed by startup accelerators usually have given a small but significant share of equity 
to the startup accelerator for only a small amount of money. 
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6.2 Do better accelerators ’accelerate’ more? 
The Seed Accelerator Rankings Project (SARP) is a ranking of the top startup accelerator 
programs in the U.S. The ranking compares the performance of different accelerator programs 
and it is meant to provide advice for entrepreneurs who are thinking about participating in an 
accelerator program. SARP uses confidential data directly from participating startup accelera-
tors and supplements it with public and proprietaty data sources. They also interview startup 
accelerator alumni, venture capitalists, angel investors and accelerator program directors. 
SARP's main assessment metrics are as follows: 
• Valuation: Mean and median valuation across all portfolio companies. Since startup 
accelerators vary in age and their graduates might therefore be in different stages of 
development, SARP also considers valuations for the first three years since graduating 
from an acceletator program. 
• Qualified exit: SARP considers issuing an IPO or getting acquired for an amount 
greater than $5 million above the amount of capital raised by the company to be a  
qualified exit. SARP then utilizes the percentage of startup accelerator program gradu-
ates that had a qualified exit. 
• Qualified fundraising: SARP considers qualified fundraising to occur when a com-
pany that has raised an aggregate of at least $250,0004. SARP then utilizes the percen-
tage of startup accelerator program graduates that had a qualified raise within the first 
12 months of graduation and the percentage of graduates who have had a qualified rai-
se up to the date when the data was measured. 
• Survival: Percentage of startup accelerator graduate companies still in business. 
SARP considers survival at one, two and three years out from program end. 
• Founder satisfaction: SARP surveys entrepreneurs who have graduated from startup 
accelerator programs. SARP asks two questions; whether entrepreneurs would repeat 
the program knowing what they know now about the experience, and whether they 
would recommend the program to a friend. The recommendation question is asked on 
a scale of 0-10 and it is used to calculate a Net Promoter Score (NPS) for each prog-
ram. 
The metrics used by SARP are discussed in more detail in the appendix 2. SARP ranked acce-
lerator programs in 2014 from first place to last place but in later years it has categorized 
																																								 																				
4	This threshold was lowered to $200,000 in the 2016 ranking. 
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programs by tiers. The highest tier in 2016 rankings was platinum. Combining the 2014 and 
2016 rankings as well as the long term startup outcomes using the number of acquired portfo-
lio companies as a proxy, I sort the accelerators in my sample into two categories; premium 
accelerators and standard5. I then compare the two categories of accelerators along three di-
mensions. 
I find that graduates from premium accelerators do not get acquired any sooner than graduates 
from other less prominent accelerators. For both groups the average age at acquisition is 
around 3 years. However graduates from premium accelerators attract signicantly more fun-
ding, on average two times more, than graduates from other accelerators. The number of in-
vestors these companies have by the time they get acquired are in line with this finding. Gra-
duates from premium accelerators have on average around eight different investors while gra-
duates from other accelerators only have around four different investors. Table 6 summarizes 
these findings. 
These results do not give any evidence for my third hypothesis that participating in a premium 
accelerator results in earlier acquisition. However there is strong evidence for my second hy-
pothesis that participating in a premium accelerator gives a firm much better chances of att-
racting investors and raising funding. Both of these are of course critical for startup survival 
and therefore dramatically improve the chances of getting acquired in the first place. This can 
also be seen in my sample data as the more prominent accelerators have signicantly more 
exits than than the less prominent accelerators. Therefore from an entrepreneur’s perspective, 
premium accelerators create much more value to their portfolio companies even though there 
is no difference in the time it takes to get an exit via acquisition. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
																																								 																				
5	SARP uses metrics that evaluates startup accelerators mostly on short-term basis. Therefore some accelerators that could be considered 
premium solely on the basis of SARP rankings have been also evaluated on other metrics such as the number of exits. 
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Table 5.  
Startup accelerator rankings and categorization 
The table reports the Seed Accelerator Rankings Project’s (SARP) ranking or category for 
each startup accelerator included in the sample. Category column reports whether a startup 
accelerator is considered premium or standard in this paper after taking into consideration 
SARP’s rankings and the number of exits. 
Accelerator 2014 ranking 
2016 
ranking Category 
Y Combinator Not ranked Platinum Premium 
Techstars #3 Platinum Premium 
500 Startups #8 Platinum Premium 
AngelPad #1 Platinum Standard 
Alchemist Accelerator #5 Platinum Standard 
Amplify.LA #7 Platinum Standard 
DreamIT Ventures #10 Gold Standard 
AlphaLab #16 Silver Standard 
Betaspring #19 Silver Standard 
The Brandery Not ranked Gold Standard 
FounderFuel Not ranked Not ranked Standard 
PIE Not ranked Not ranked Standard 
fbFund Not ranked Not ranked Standard 
Launchpad LA Not ranked Not ranked Standard 
Imagine K12 Not ranked Not ranked Standard 
Rock Health Not ranked Not ranked Standard 
UpWest Labs Not ranked Not ranked Standard 
i/o Ventures Not ranked Not ranked Standard 
Seedcamp Not ranked Not ranked Standard 
Source: Seed Accelerator Rankings Project’s 2014 and 2016 accelerator rankings. 
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Table 6.  
Comparison of premium and standard accelerators  
The table compares premium and standard startup accelerator backed firms along three di-
mensions at the time the firms were acquired. AGE rows report the average and median age 
of the firms in years. FUNDING rows report the average and median equity funding raised by 
the companies in millions of U.S. dollars. INVESTORS rows report the average and median 
number of different investors. Test of differences column reports the p-values from statistical 
difference tests between the two means and medians for each variable. N –columns report the 
number of observations for each variable for both premium and standard accelerators. 
 
Premium 
accelerator 
backed firms 
N 
Standard 
accelerator 
backed firms 
N 
Test of 
differences 
(p-values) 
Average AGE 3,1 90 2,9 31 0,2652 
Median AGE 3,0 90 3,0 31 1 
      
Average FUNDING 6,2 67 2,5 22 0,0032 
Median FUNDING 2,4 67 1,7 22 0,5679 
      
Average INVESTORS 8,2 85 4,4 23 0,0004 
Median INVESTORS 7,0 85 4,0 23 0,0021 
 
6.3 Are all accelerator programs worth it? 
As discussed in section 2, earlier literature finds that some startup accelerator programs might 
be detrimental to their portfolio companies. Hathaway (2016) suggests that some startup acce-
lerator programs seem to have no impact or some accelerators might even slow down startup 
development. Based on my results it is rather clear that participating in a higher quality star-
tup accelerator is a better choice, assuming one could get accepted to any accelerator program. 
The equity shares which entrepreneurs give to startup accelerators do not vary significantly 
between accelerators and therefore being able to attract more funding and investors among 
other benefits give more value for the same price6. However the most prominent startup acce-
lerators are highly competitive and their acceptance rates are only few percent for each prog-
ram. Then a question, whether startups that can not get accepted to the highest quality accele-
rators should participate in lower quality accelerators, arises. Their other option is to proceed 
without participating in an accelerator program and try to attract regular venture capital fun-
																																								 																				
6	Table 2 lists equity shares taken by different startup accelerators included in the sample. 
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ding, assuming the company needs funding. Another option would be to first participate in a 
lower quality accelerator to gain more traction that would help the company to get accepted 
into a more prominent startup accelerator. In my sample there were a couple firms that did 
this but I do not expect any startup to do this purposefully. Instead, I expect firms to only go 
this route if they didn’t get similar benefits from the first program that they expected to get 
when entering the more prominent program later. Table 7 compares graduate companies from 
standard accelerators in my sample and their matched regular venture capital backed firms 
along three dimensions7. If a data point for a variable could not be obtained for both the stan-
dard startup accelerator backed firm and its matched firm, the comparison does not include 
that pair. Therefore the number of pairs may be different for each variable and the averages 
presented in table 7 may be different from table 4 and table 6. 
 
Table 7. 
Comparison of standard accelerator graduate companies and regular venture capital 
backed companies at time of acquisition  
The table compares standard startup accelerator (i.e. less prominent accelerators as categori-
zed in table 5) graduate companies and only venture capital backed companies at the time 
they were acquired. AGE row reports the average age of the firms in years. FUNDING row 
reports the average equity funding raised by the companies in millions of U.S. dollars. IN-
VESTORS row reports the average number of different investors. Test of differences column 
reports the p-values from statistical difference tests between the two means for each variable. 
The number of pairs column reports the number of acquired startup accelerator backed com-
panies which could be matched with a venture capital backed firm where the data for both 
was available. 
 
Standard        
accelerator 
backed firms 
VC backed 
firms 
Test of 
differences 
(p-values) 
Number 
of pairs 
Average AGE 3,0 5,4 0,0080 25 
Average FUNDING 2,1 9,3 0,0902 8 
Average INVESTORS 4,4 5,1 0,7862 7 
 
																																								 																				
7 Premium accelerators are not included in the comparison since it was already showed in section 6.1 that overall startup accelerators  do 
shorten the time it takes to get acquired. Furthermore, section 6.2 already shows that premium accelerators do work better than less pro-
minent ones. 
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I find that, when comparing standard accelerator backed firms and their matched peers with 
only venture capital investor backing, the firms do not differ on certain characteristics from 
the results from comparing the entire sample of all startup accelerator backed firms with their 
matched regular venture capital backed firms. Standard accelerator backed firms get still ac-
quired significantly earlier when compared to their venture capital investor backed peers. 
Venture capital backed firms also seem to attract more funding even though this could not be 
confirmed statistically due to the sample size of matched companies being relatively small. 
One difference when comparing the results to those of the comparison of the entire sample of 
all accelerators and their matched venture capital backed peers is the average number of in-
vestors the companies have at the time of their acquisition. The results indicate that standard 
accelerator graduates seem not be able to attract any more investors than their matched ventu-
re capital investor backed peers. Even though the sample size of matched pairs is small, the 
result suggests that this is where standard accelerators fail to provide value to their portfolio 
companies. However based on these results a conclusion, that the less prominent startup acce-
lerators are not beneficial to their portfolio companies, can’t be made. Instead the most plau-
sible reason explaining these results is that startups participating in less prominent accelerator 
programs weren’t the highest quality startups in the first place. Thus my fourth hypothesis 
could not be confirmed. 
 
6.4 Abnormal returns to acquirers of startup accelerator backed firms 
From the sample of 116 acquisitions of startup accelerator backed companies for which there 
was data available to calculate abnormal returns, 110 firms could be matched a similar ventu-
re capital investor backed firm. Table 8 compares the abnormal returns to acquiring com-
panies when acquiring startup accelerator backed firms and regular venture capital investor 
backed firms. 
I find that abnormal returns to acquirers are on average significantly positive, 2.1%, when 
acquiring a firm that has participated in a startup accelerator program. The abnormal returns 
are on the other hand significantly negative when acquiring a regular venture capital investor 
backed firm; on average -2.1%. This result confirms my fifth hypothesis. 
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Table 8. 
Cumulative abnormal returns to acquiring companies  
The table reports cumulative abnormal returns (-10, +10) to acquiring companies when they 
acquire startup accelerator backed companies and companies backed only by venture capital 
firms. Test of differences column reports the p-values from statistical difference tests between 
the two means and medians respectively. The number of pairs for the acquisitions of startup 
accelerator backed and venture capital investor backed firms in the sample is 110. 
 
Acquisitions of 
accelerator backed 
firms 
Acquisitions of VC 
backed firms 
Test of 
differences 
(p-values) 
Average CAR (-10, +10) 2,11 % -2,11 % 0,005 
Median CAR (-10, +10) 0,81 % -2,09 % 0,055 
 
As startup accelerator backed companies get acquired younger and with less raised funding, 
this makes them harder to value. Typically a company’s financial value is based on profits 
and its future cash flows. However for younger tech startups, profits might be small or even 
negative and the future cash flows might be difficult to estimate. Therefore it is much more 
likely that these firms are valued by acquirers based on how the target company fits on their 
short or long term strategies. Thus one potential explanation for the differences in the abnor-
mal returns to acquiring companies is that the acquisition announcements where the target is 
an acceletator program graduate reveal more information on the acquiring company’s future 
plans while the acquisitions of regular venture capital backed investor companies are more 
based on financials. 
My results are well in line with previous literature. As noted by Ragozzino and Blevins 
(2016), a higher number of venture capital investors increases the likelihood of an acquisition 
but they found no evidence for the total amount of funding having impact on the likelihood of 
an acquisition. Therefore Ragozzino and Blevins’ finding supports the hypothesis that startup 
accelerator backed firms seem to give more control over exit to their investors when compa-
red to only venture capital backed firms. Furthermore, since most venture capital firms’ funds 
have a fixed maturity, this also helps to explain why startup accelerator backing results in 
higher acquirer returns. 
My results also provide some support for the argument that startup accelerators might help 
reduce information asymmetry between the acquiring company and the target company. As 
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noted by Gompers and Xuan (2008), acquirers earn more positive returns around the ac-
quisition announcement date when information asymmetries are lower. Startup accelerators, 
at least the most prominent ones, have connections to a wide network of large corporates, in-
vestors and other stakeholders, and they also work closely with their portfolio companies. 
Thus they have high potential to reduce information asymmetries for the good of all parties 
involved in the acquisition transaction. However as suggested by Kim and Wagman (2014), 
startup accelerators have an incentive to exit their investments earlier if they learn that a port-
folio company might have less potential than initially thought. Therefore they might be ready 
to accept a lower acquisition price and use their control rights to make the founding entrepre-
neur also accept the offer.  
 
6.5 Does accelerator quality matter for acquiring companies? 
Acquiring companies earn higher abnormal returns when they acquire premium accelerator 
backed firms as compared to other less prominent accelerator backed firms. I find that the 
average abnormal return is 3,2% for acquisitions of premium accelerator backed firms and 0,3% 
for other accelerator backed firms. However the difference between the two means is not sta-
tistically significant (p-value 0,27). Therefore my sixth hypothesis could not be confirmed. 
However this result suggests that mostly due to similar factors when comparing acquisitions 
of startup accelerator graduate companies and only venture capital investor backed companies, 
premium accelerator backing might result in slightly higher acquirer returns if there was a 
bigger sample. 
From potential acquirer’s perspective the main question regarding a startup accelerator’s role 
in the development of the target company is how exactly does the accelerator’s involvement 
signal quality. If the acquirer’s motive for the acquisition is bringing in talent, then prominent 
accelerators are likely to come ahead. The argument made by Hallen, Bingham and Cohen 
(2016) was that consultation provided by accelerators to their portfolio companies is the key 
driver for better venture outcomes. As prominent accelerators have more more resources, they 
are able to provide higher quality consultation and thus they are able to increase more the 
skills of entrepreneurs participating in their programs. The more prominent accelerators also 
have wider networks of mentors working with portfolio companies and more alumni. This 
might come to importance when the target company gets acquired younger. As mentioned in 
section 3.1, younger tech companies are difficult to value and their valuations are more de-
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termined by how they fit with the acquiring company’s strategy. When the acquisition is dri-
ven by strategic value rather than financial synergies, there has to be an internal champion 
internalizing the reasons for the acquisition. Thus the wider networks of prominent accelera-
tors might increase the likelihood of an acquisition. Furthermore, if the acquisitions of startup 
accelerator graduate companies are mostly driven by strategic value, the more prominent ac-
celerators might be better in reducing information asymmetries. 
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7 LIMITATIONS 
 
Since the startup accelerator phenomenon is relatively new, the biggest limitation of this study 
is small sample size. As noted earlier, some of the hypotheses could have been confirmed if 
there was a bigger sample size. Another limitation of the sample data is that it might only take 
into account successful cases. The data for accelerator participation was collected from 
Crunchbase, which is a community updated database. Therefore it gives investors and startup 
founders a chance to purposefully omit or hide data from Crunchbase. This might be especial-
ly problematic in cases where investors have managed to get control over exit and decided to 
sell the company against founding team’s wishes or in cases where founders may have been 
forced to give up operative duties in their companies. 
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8 CONCLUSIONS 
 
8.1 Summary of findings 
This papers studies the startup accelerator phenomenon and the long-term impacts of startup 
accelerators. More specifically, I study startup accelerator backed firms at the time of their 
acquisition. Based on hand-collected data in the United States over nearly a 10 year period, I 
examine these firms both from the entrepreneur’s perspective and the acquiring company’s 
perspective. 
Matching firms that have graduated from a startup accelerator program with firms that have 
only had regular venture capital financing, I find that startup accelerator graduates get ac-
quired significantly younger than their matched peers. This difference in age is however ref-
lected in the amount of funding that these firms raise before they get acquired. Firms backed 
only by venture capital investors raise on average four times more funding than startup acce-
lerator graduates. Despite getting acquired younger and raising less funding, startup accelera-
tor graduates still have on average sligthly more investors than their matched peers. Overall, 
these results suggest that startup accelerator programs have a positive impact on their portfo-
lio companies and the accelerators indeed ’accelerate’ the development of startups. 
Startup accelerators take a meaningful share of equity for an investment that is typically signi-
ficantly lower than normal early stage venture capital investment. Thus entrepreneurs expect 
to get other benefits, such as connections with investors and consultation, to compensate for 
this difference. I find significant differences in the amount of funding and number of investors 
when comparing graduate firms from the most prominent accelerators to those who have gra-
duated from less prominent accelerators. Even though these results are strong indicators of 
startup success, I find that successful companies from the less prominent accelerators still get 
acquired significantly younger than their venture capital investor backed peer firms. These 
results confirm that in general all accelerators are able to speed up the development of star-
tups. 
I study the acquisitions of startup accelerator graduate firms from an acquiring company’s by 
analyzing the abnormal stock returns around the acquisition announcement dates. I find that 
announcements of startup accelerator backed companies result in significantly higher abnor-
mal returns when compared to announcements of acquisitions of regular venture capital inves-
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tor backed firms. The most likely reason for the higher abnormal returns in acquisitions of 
startup accelerator backed firms is the amount of control startup accelerator backed firms give 
to their investors. As mentioned earlier, startup accelerators take significant equity ownership, 
but they don’t provide significant funding in return. Furthermore, startup accelerator gradu-
ates have more investors than their matched peers which could increase the chances of an ear-
lier exit since most venture capital funds have fixed maturities. Startup accelerators also might 
have an incentive to exit their investments early since they rely partly on their track records of 
successful portfolio companies. Another explanation for the differences in abnormal returns is 
that startup accelerator involvement could help reduce information asymmetries, which have 
been shown in previous literature to impact abnormal returns. Startup accelerators work close-
ly with their portfolio companies during and after the accelerator programs. They also have 
wide networks which makes them ideally positioned to reduce information asymmetries. A 
third potential explantion for the difference in abnormal returns is that acquisitions of startup 
accelerator graduates reveal valuable information about the acquiring company’s future plans 
to the stock markets. Since startup accelerator graduates get acquired at younger age and with 
smaller valuations, they are difficult to value based on profits or by modelling future cash 
flows. Instead, they are more likely to be valued by how well they fit on the acquiring compa-
ny’s short or long term strategies. 
 
8.2 Suggestions for further research 
As the first modern startup accelerators only emerged in mid-2000’s, there has only been li-
mited amount of earlier research on the topic. Furthermore, it usually takes multiple years 
until startups have an exit either through an IPO or an acquitision. Therefore, most earlier 
papers studying startup accelerators focus on shorter time periods. Only recently, there has 
been enough data to study the longer term outcomes and impacts of accelerator programs. 
The results presented in this paper suggest that entrepreneurs might be able obtain better valu-
ations for their companies when their companies are getting acquired if they had not participa-
ted in a startup accelerator. However as the data is only available for succesful exits, the result 
does not take into consideration that the likelihood of a succesful exit or even startup survival 
is lower had the startup not participated in a startup accelerator program. As the results in this 
paper show, especially first-time founders benefit significantly from startup accelerator prog-
rams as they may lack skills and networks to raise funding. However it may be interesting to 
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study if previously successful entrepreneurs have better outcomes when compared to startup 
accelerator graduates. 
As the biggest limitation of this paper is a relatively small sample size, some of the hypot-
heses could not be verified with statistical tests. Therefore many of these hypotheses could be 
tested again in the future as more data becomes available. Another research opportunity 
would be to include acquisitions from multiple countries to make the sample size bigger. With 
more data in the future, studying also the impact of growing cohort sizes of startup accelerator 
programs may become possible. 
Many large companies have launched their owned startup accelerator programs or they have 
partnered with an established startup accelerator. This may offer further research oppor-
tunities in the future for comparing the longer term outcomes of the sponsored programs 
compared to generic programs. 
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APPENDIX 1: Descriptions of accelerators included in the sample 
 
Accelerator Description 
 
Y Combinator 
• Years operative: 2005 -  present 
• Location: Mountain View, California 
• Website: http://www.ycombinator.com 
 
 
Y Combinator is a leading American seed accelerator 
with combined over $80 billion valuation of portfolio 
and alumni companies. In the main program, Y Com-
binator selectes two batches of startups each year. 
 
Techstars 
• Years operative: 2006 – present 
• Location: Boulder, Colorado 
• Website: https://www.techstars.com 
 
 
Techstars is one of the largest accelerators with diffe-
rent programs in major cities around the world. It also 
offers a variety of vertical programs typically in co-
operation with large corporations. 
 
500 startups 
• Years operative: 2010 – present 
• Location: Mountain view, California 
• Website: https://500.co 
 
 
500 Startups is a global startup accelerator which has 
invested in over 2000 companies. The seed program is 
4-months long and it is run both in San Francisco and 
Mexico City. 
 
DreamIT Ventures 
• Years operative: 2008 – present 
• Location: Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 
• Website: http://www.dreamit.com 
 
DreamIT ventures offers 14-week programs based in 
Philadelphia and New York. More than 300 startups 
have participated in DreamIT’s programs. The recent 
programs have focused in specific indusries such as 
health, edtech and urban tech. 
 
 
Seedcamp 
• Years operative: 2007 – present 
• Location: London, United Kingdom 
• Website: http://seedcamp.com 
 
 
Seedcamp is an early-stage investor founded by a 
group of 30 European investors. Originally modeled 
after the Y Combinator model, Seedcamp has since 
shifted towards first round investments. Seedcamp has 
invested in over 250 companies. 
 
Alchemist Accelerator 
• Years operative: 2012 – present 
• Location: San Francisco, California 
• Website: http://alchemistaccelerator.com 
 
Alchemist Accelerator is an accelerator that focuses on 
startups whose revenue comes from enterprises. The 
accelerator is backed by some of the most well-known 
VC funds and strategic corporate investors. 
 
 
AngelPad 
• Years operative: 2010 – present 
• Location: San Francisco, California 
• Website: https://angelpad.org 
 
 
AngelPad is one of the most selective accelerator   
programs with relatively small cohort sizes. The Seed 
Accelerators Ranking Project has ranked AngelPad in 
the top tier both in the 2016 and 2017 studies. 
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Accelerator Description 
 
AlphaLab 
• Years operative: 2008 -  present 
• Location: Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania 
• Website: http://alphalab.org 
 
 
AlphaLab is a nationally ranked software startup     
accelerator. It was founded by Innovation Works, 
Pittsburgh’s largest seed-stage investor, to accelerate 
the growth of promising companies in the region. 
 
The Brandery 
• Years operative: 2010 – present 
• Location: Cincinnati, Ohio 
• Website: http://brandery.org 
 
 
The Brandery is a seed stage accelerator which       
specializes in branding, marketing and design. The 
accelerator works actively with creative agencies and it 
is sponsored by large corporations. 
 
FounderFuel 
• Years operative: 2009 – present 
• Location: Montréal, Canada 
• Website: http://founderfuel.com 
 
 
FounderFuel is a leading accelerator in Canada. It   
offers 3-month programs once a year with cohort sizes 
of around 10 companies. FounderFuel has accelerated 
over 80 companies. 
 
PIE 
• Years operative: 2011 - 2014 
• Location: Portland, Oregon 
• Website: http://www.piepdx.com 
 
 
The Portland Incubator Experiment, or PIE, started as 
a coworking space but started running 3-month      
accelerator programs in 2011. It is run by the          
advertising agency Wieden+Kennedy. 
 
 
fbFund 
• Years operative: 2009 – 2010 
• Location: Palo Alto, California 
• Website: N/A 
 
 
FbFund was an accelerator providing micro-seed      
investments to startups developing applications and 
websites related to Facebook. It was administed by 
Accel and Founders Fund, two very prominent VC 
firms. 
 
 
Amplify.LA 
• Years operative: 2011 – present 
• Location: Venice, California 
• Website: http://amplify.la 
 
 
Amplify offers four-month accelerator programs with 
rolling start dates instead of the typical ”class-based” 
structure. As a part of their model Amplify also 
doesn’t have demo days but instead has showcases 
where investors can meet with preselect companies. 
 
 
Launchpad LA 
• Years operative: 2009 – present 
• Location: Santa Monica, California 
• Website: http://launchpad.la 
 
Launchpad LA was originally started as a mentorship 
organization but started offering accelerator programs 
in 2011. The accelerator program is modeled after the 
Techstars and Y Combinator models. 
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Accelerator Description 
 
Betaspring 
• Years operative: 2009 -  2014 
• Location: Providence, Rhode Island 
• Website: - 
 
 
Betaspring was a high-ranked accelerator that run two 
13-week programs a year. During its operation, 89 
companies participated in Betaspring’s accelerator 
programs. 
 
Imagine K12 
• Years operative: 2011 – present 
• Location: Redwood City, California 
• Website: http://www.imaginek12.com 
 
 
Imagine K12 is a startup accelerator that focuses on 
startups creating products and services for the educati-
on industry. The accelerator merged with Y Com-
binator in 2016 and currently operates as its education 
vertical. 
 
 
Rock Health 
• Years operative: 2010 – present 
• Location: San Francisco, California 
• Website: https://rockhealth.com 
 
 
Rock Health is a seed fund investor that was started as 
a startup accelerator. Rock Health focuses on digital 
health startups. The accelerator model was dispensed 
in the autumn of 2013. 
 
UpWest Labs 
• Years operative: 2012 - present 
• Location: Palo Alto, California 
• Website: http://upwestlabs.com 
 
 
UpWest Labs is an accelerator that focuses on Israeli 
entrepreneurs looking to enter the US market or have 
already established presence in the US. In 2015, Up-
West also started also investing in more mature star-
tups looking to raise Series A and beyond. 
 
 
I/o Ventures 
• Years operative: 2010 – present 
• Location: San Francisco, California 
• Website: http://ventures.io/ 
 
 
I/o Ventures is a startup accelerator that runs 6-month 
programs with relatively small batch sizes. I/o Ventu-
res also operates a co-working space in the same space 
it runs its programs. 
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APPENDIX 2: Seed Accelerator Rankings Project criteria and assessment 
metrics 
 
The Seed Accelerator Ranking Project (SARP) is an independent research entity run by Yael 
Hochberg (Rice University and MIT Innovation Initiative Lab), Susan Cohen (University of 
Richmond) and Daniel Fehder (MIT Innovation Initiative Lab). SARP ranks startup accelera-
tors based on relative performance along multiple dimensions that may be important to entre-
preneurs. 
Inclusion criteria 
SARP invited over 150 programs to participate in the rankings both in 2014 and in 2016. To 
be included in the rankings, programs had to meet the following criteria: 
• Meet the definition of a startup accelerator: a fixed term, cohort-based program with a 
mentorship and education component that culminates in a public pitch event, or demo 
day 
• Have graduated at least one cohort and have at least 10 alumni 
• Based in the U.S. 
• Be willing to provide transparency 
The SARP team notes that while some accelerator programs meet the criteria, there is still 
some level of self-categorization. For example Y Combinator was not included in the 2014 
ranking but would have been at the top of the ranking if they chose to participate. Overall, 
SARP used self-definitions of accelerators for the purpose of exclusion from the rankings 
project in 2014. However in 2016 self-definitions as a purpose of exclusion seems to have 
been dropped. 
Measures used to compute the rankings 
• Valuation: Valuations for portfolio companies are determined when a firm has a pri-
ced round. SARP considers mean and median valuations both across all portfolio 
companies, counting those that had not had priced rounds as zeroes, and conditional 
upon having obtained priced financing. Since startup accelerators vary in age and their 
alumni may be in later stages of development with correspondingly higher valuations, 
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SARP also considers valuations one year out from program completion, two years out 
from program completion and three years out from program completion.  
• Qualified exit: SARP considers issuing an IPO or getting acquired for an amount 
greater than $5 million above the amount of capital raised by the company to be a  
qualified exit. A qualified exit indicates that the entrepreneur and other investors can 
cash out if they wish. SARP chose the $5 million threshold to represent a sum of mo-
ney that would materially affect an entrepreneur’s life. SARP utilizes the percantage 
of alumni companies that had a qualified exit in its ranking. 
• Qualified fundraising: SARP considers qualified fundraising to occur when a com-
pany that has raised an aggregate of at least $250,000 (this threshold was lowered to 
$200,000 in the 2016 ranking). SARP chose the threshold to represent a sum of money 
that exceeds the guaranteed investment capital typically available to any particular ac-
celerator’s graduates through convertible notes. SARP's ranking utilizes the percenta-
ge of program alumni companies that have had a qualified raise within 12 months of 
graduation, the percentage of alumni had a qualified raise to date, and the mean and 
median amounts raised by these two points in time both across the entire portfolio un-
conditionally counting companies that did not raise as zeroes and conditional on fun-
draising. 
• Survival: Percentage of alumni companies still in business. SARP considers survival 
at one, two and three years out from program end. 
• Founder satisfaction: SARP uses a survey to determine founder satisfaction. SARP 
asked entrepreneurs whether they would repeat the accelerator program knowing what 
they know about the experience and whether they would recommend the program to a 
friend. The recommendation question is asked on a scale of 0-10 and was used to 
compute a Net Promoter Score (NPS). Those who answer 9 or 10 are promoters, those 
who answer 7 or 8 are passives and those who answer 6 or below are detractors. The 
percantage of detractors is then substracted from the percentage of promoters to de-
termine NPS.  
SARP gives metrics within these categories different weights and categories are then weigh-
ted to produce an overall score. SARP’s ranking gives relatively higher weightings for valu-
ations, fundraising and exits while a relatively lower weighting is given to survival. 
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